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I. lntroduction
In efficient financial markets by a common definition, asset price variability depends so 1e1y on variability of so called fundamental factors inf1uencing the actua1 cash f10ws to the owner of the asset. lt seems reasonab1e to define excess volatility in asset markets as f1uctuation in price relative to an efficient market benchmark. In finance theory this benchmark price ref1ects "all avai1ab1e information" and according1y, prices ch ange on1y as a resu1 t of news about fundamentals.
The normative aspect of efficiency is that asset prices revea1 all avai1ab1e information and, therefore, investment decisions by firms using financial market returns to measure the cost of capital wou1d incorporate fu11y this information. Cnder the strongest definition of efficiency, available information includes private information whi1e under weaker definitions only "publicly availab"ie" information is ref1ected in price. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) showed that if information of relevance for asset pricing is costly, then it is impossible for asset prices to be "informationally efficient" in the sense that prices perfectly reveal all information held by agents. If they did, nobody would incur the costs of acquiring the relevant information. Agents' incentive to acquire information is influenced by an externa1ity which may cause a free-rider problem.
The starting point in this paper is that important information is costly to acquire. Tne costs may take different forms to be discussed below. ~luch information about management capability , technologica1 skills and development cannot be described by simple disturbances to the stream of earnings or the rate of return. I will therefore distinguish between shocks to fundamentals and to structural parameters such as time series properties of cost or demand variables. The common definition of market efficiency in terms of "available" information becomes ambiguous in this framework.
If most relevant information is costly to acquire or process, then equilibrium price must be determined by simultaneous equilibria in the markets for financial assets and for information. We must ask what information set is consistent with a zero incentive to acquire as well as to provide information taking potential externalities of information acquisition into account. Price fluctuations may depend on changes in the information set as well as in fundamental factors and even if the information set is constant the price response to disturbances depends on the information set of agents. Efficiency of markets becomes a somewhat elusive coneept determined by effieiency in information aequisition and dissemination rather than in markets for seeurities .
The effieieney of information markets and information reflected in market priees depend on the degree to v."hieh externalities and other mark et imperfeetions inhibit information aequisition.
In this paper I diseuss howeosts of information about fundamental faetors as well as parameters influenee price adjustment in a market for a risky security. Struetural parameters are, for example, the time series charaeteristics and the probability distributions of fundamental faetors. The latter faetors may be dem and and east eonditions for a firm.
An interesting issue arises with respect tO information aequisition about management eapability and technologieal progress.
Due to asymmetric information and principal agent problems, these factors may not be truly exogenous relative to the information contained in the market' s valuation of a firm.
Information dissemination for such factors may in fact not be the most efficient in a decentralized securities market.
The larger issue for financial market efficiency which is raised by this discussion is ~hat financial institutionaI structure is most efficient for dissemination of information about firm and project value to suppliers of financial resources? Some types of information may be dissiminated efficiently in decentralized securities markets of the type discussed in most of this paper but other types of information may be better disseminated with in more centralized structures like industrial groups around a bank with large financial and personal investments in firms.
The paper proceeds as follo,,;s: In Section II a simple model for pricing of a multiperiod risky security is developed and sources of price fluctuations are described. The incentive to acquire information and potential free rider problems are described in Section III.
Equilibrium adjustment and equilibrium information acquisition are studied in Section IV. In one case structural parameters are known but fundamental disturbances are not, and in another case, current disturbances are observable but structural parameters are not known with certainty.
Conditions under which free rider problems arise and conditions for all agents to choose to become informed in spite of information externalities are derived. These conditions are studied further in Section V where "degree of efficiency" is discussed in more detail.
In Sect:ion VI it: is argued t:hat signalling, monitoring, control, and insider trading are substitutes for information acquisition in the determination of the equilibrium information set. Finally ,
Section VII contains conclusion about price adjustment and appropriate definitions of market efficiency. Empirical evidence on stock-price behavior is also interpreted in this section.
II. Asset Price Adjustment, Information Acguisition and the Free Rider
Problem; A Framework
This section develops a framework for analyzing the determinants of a multiperiod asset's price and for analyzing the incentive to acquire information.
Following Grossman (1976) , it is assumed that each agent choosing between one riskyasset and one risk-less asset maximizes a utility function characterized by constant absolute risk-aversion:
period t and c is a risk-aversion parameter.
There are two types of individuals, informed and uninformed denoted by superscripts I and U. Eaeh agent starts in period t with wealth equal to 1. Uninformed agents invest S~ in a riskyasset with the one-period return U r t and (l-St) in the risk-less asset with the one period return r F . Informed individuals spend an amount z on information and invest
(1-z) e! in the riskyasset and (1-Z)(l-e!) in the risk-free asset. 1
Wealth of the two agents in period t+l are: return on the riskyasset for informed and uninformed, respectively.
Initially it is assumed that a share A or all agents have acquired a certain kind of information. Equilibrium in the market ror the risky asset is then described by:
where 8 is the exogenous supply or the riskyasset per agent. So far the model is similar to the one period model in Grossman (1976) , Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), and Diamond (1985) . In order to distinguish clearly between the role of uncertainty about rundamentals and uncertainty about structural parameters, including time-se:::-ies characteristics of disturbances, I assume that the riskyasset is a multiperiod claim on a firm with earnings R t in period t. The valuation of the earnings stream ror the two individuals are (Sa)
In a perfeet auetioneer-market priee adjusts so that I U Pt=Vt=V t (6) These speeifieations imply that an informed (uninformed) individual in period t expeets to be informed (uninformed) in every future period as weIl. In the diseussion of the information market below it will be argued that this assumption is reasonable. Given expeetations and uneertainty about the earnings-stream, and given total supply, individuals of the two types adjust their holdings el and e U , under the eonstraint in (4) that supply e is willingly held, until diseount rates in (3a) and (3b) are sueh that the earnings-stream is valued identieally by bot h types of individuals . It is c1early not meaningful in this framework to assume that risk-adjusted diseount rates are exogenous and eonstant as is of ten done in the finanee literature. In this framework there is a downward sloping demand curve for ths riskyasset. In an n-asset economy, the demand eurve for eaeh risky 3sset would be downward ') slipping as long as eaeh asset does not have a per feet substitute.~ To specify how priee adjustment "depends on rundamentals and structural parameters, it is assumed that earnings in period t eonsists or two faetors, x t and Yt' sueh that
The facto r x t has a degree of persistenee with the following It may seem far-fetched that prices reveal private information without agents being able to trade based on such information before the price adjusts. In the following an error term E will be added to the p market price in order for information acquisition to be possible.
-8-\ Specifically, it is assumed that
It is assumed that the mark et noise term e t is a normally distributed p, random variable with variance o ep This assumption is very strong and perhaps unrealistic.
Interpretations of this term are discussed in Section V. The consequence of the noise term is that the price is not a "sufficient statistic" for revelation of x t to the uninformed. 4 As will be noted below, there is still an information externaIity in the price, as long as P t contains some information about x t .
The existence of noise in the price signal implies that uninformed agents observe two signals, R t and .P t . R is ex + y ) while P as t t t t
given by (12) is a function of x t and ep,t i f A > O.
section an explicit formulation for price is derived.
In the next
The most simple way of describing the determina::ion of A, the share of informed firms is to assume, like Grossman and S::iglitz (1980) that in eaeh period information about x t can be purchased at a fixed eost (z) from some agent. If there is no explicit market for information then information may be gathered and analyzed by each agent .
. ,5 at a eost z ln every perloa.
Information processing and the ability to interpret information and gain aet.ual knowledge may also require subst.antial investment in the capability to gather and analyze information. For example, traders in financial market may have to work a long time in the market in order to acquire a "feel" for how t.he market reacts to different kinds of information and to sort. out useless information from valuable information. The formal analysis will be restricted to period by period acquisition of information at a east but the analysis applies, as weIl, to the decision to invest in capability to gather and analyze information. 6
The incentive to gather information for each agent in period t can be written as: (13) This express ion evaluates at the time the agent is uniformed the expected gain of becoming informed in terms of expected utility at time t + 1. Utility functions are given by eq. (1) above. A simplifying 7 transformation of (13) is given by:
Equilibrium in the information market occurs when I t = O which implies that I t = O, as w'ell. Using the definition of W t + l in (2), and first-order conditions in (3) for el and e U , (14) can be developed and written as:
In (15) (l+r j ) = E~[Pt+l/Ptl for j = I,C and the variances in denominators are the variances of these terms. Thus, in order to solve for the equilibrium share of informed firms CA) we must first solve for P t and E[P t + l ] as functions of A, taking into account that the price itself reveals the information of the informed to the uninformed. 8 This issue is addressed in the next section.
In a model without endogenous information acquisition price variability is usually derived as a function of structural parameters in a straightforward manner. For example, it was shown in (11) that price adjustment to a perceived change in the fundamental x t depends in a specific way on perceptions about, for example, the risk-aversion coefficient, the time-series parameter p, as weIl as, on the variances of these parameters.
With endogenous information acquisition the adjustment-coefficient influences the incentive to acquire information and the share of informed firms. The dependence of the adjustment coefficient on parameters is therefore more complex. For example, a known increase in the time series parameter p would tend to increase the magnitude of price adjustment to a disturbance in x t ' Through (15) the incentive to acquire information would change and, as a result, the adjustment coefficient may increase or decrease. An explicit formulatian for P t with heterogeneous information is required to analyze this issue in more , 'l 9 o.etal .
IV. Information Markets and Financial Market Price A~justment
To determine the equi l ibr ium pr ice in the aGove mode l i t is necessary to specify the information set of agents. This set depends on "hat kind of information is publicly available as "elI as "hat information can and will be acquired at a east.
a. Structural parameters knm.m, Uninformed agents cannot observe x t
To begin with, it is assumed, as in most RE-models, that all parameters are kno"n to all market participants . A known share of agents (A) have acquired information that enables them to determine x t Others have to infer x t from observations of R t in (7) and Pt in (12).
In the latter equation V+ is given by (9a). As noted uninformed agents The price P t is derived by inserting (9a) in (16). Expression (3a) is used for (l+r I ) in (9), (4) is used for eIin (3a), (3b) used for e U in (4) and (9b) is used for (l+r U ) in (3b). The following expression for P t is derived:
The numerator in (17) can also be written
It can be observed that for Q 2U 21 = (o /0 ) = 1, the numerator is r r simply the average expectation of x t multiplied by P, and the denominator is the same as for homogeneous expectat ions in (lO) .
Clearly, the share of agents choos ing to be come informed influences price adjustment to disturbances.
In order to analyze how price responds to changes in fundamentals it is necessary to solve
The information set of uninformed agents consists of R t and P t as weIl as all parameters in (17) . These two signals must be used to extract information about the three disturbanee terms € ,y and € x,t t p,t The expectation of current disturbances in x can be written in the following simple form: In other words, for uninformed agents a positive disturbance of any kind has a positive probability of being a disturbance in x t ' and the larger the variance of € relative to a weighted variance of other disturbances x the larger is the probability that any disturbanee is interpreted as a disturbance in x t ' These results are well-known in the RE-literature.
Inserting (18) inta (17) we obtain that for a given A:
where H is the denominator in (17) . Similarly:
The latter two expressions show that Yt and E influenee priee only if p,t the re is eonfusion about the fundamental faetor whieh has a persistent effect on cash flows.
What is effieieney in this framework? Clearly, given information sets the adjustment to Ex,t and Yt is "efficient." The adjustment to E is not efficient within standard RE-models, since within these
10 mo e s e eX1S ence o E 1S eonS1 ere an 1ne 1Cleney. In the p,t next seetion I argue that shifts in E may be eonsistent with RE if p,t information about struetural parameters and others' information is uneertain. In that ease the issue of efficieney may be addressed by asking whether A is the effieient share of informed individuals. We turn to the information market to analyze this issue.
The ineentive to aequire information was deseribed in eg. (15) above. In Appendix I this equation is expanded further in the ease when struetural parameters are known but x is not directly observed by the t uninformed. The following eondition for information market equilibrium is derived:
In this equation there is a positive incentive (lt) to aequire information if the left hand side is larger than the right hand side.
Information market equilibrium oeeurs for A = O (A=l) when the left hand -13-\ side is smaller (larger) than the right hand side for O < A < 1. For va lues between O and 1 the ineentive to aequire information is decreasing in A. In Appendix II this proposition is explained in more detail. Briefly, as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , the priee beeomes more informative about x t as informed agents inerease in number. Thus, there is a positive externaiity from information aequisition. u U In (22) (l+r ) = E t [P t + 1 J/P t . The existenee of this term indieates that the larger the expeeted priee ehange, the larger is the ineentive to aequire information.
Since, the expee ted pr iee ehange for the uninformed is inereasing in the absolute magnitude of eaeh disturbanee, the following proposition is obvious:
Proposition l: For O < A < l the equilibrium share of informed agents inereases as the absolute magnitude of eaeh disturbanee rises.
The ineentive to aequire information is therefore time-speeifie and the adjustment eoeffieient to eaeh disturbanee is time-varying.
By eonventionaI tests for effieieney sueh variat:on in the adjustment eoeffieient is considered evidenee of ineffieieney. 11
From equation (22) the follo~ing proposition can also be derived:
Proposition 2: For O < \ < l, the equilibrium share of informed agents a) decreases when the eost of information, z, rises; b) decreases when the risk-free interest rate, rF' rises; c) has a maximum for an intermediate level of variance of the fundamental factor t ~hi le i t is small or zero for very x,t d) small and very large variances of this variables. increases when the varianees of the noise term Einereases. is shown in a different context in Gliek and Wihlborg (1986) .
Intuitively, if 0 2 = 0, then there is no demand for information since EX X 1 provides full information. Thus, the incentive to acquire information is at a maximum when there is variation in the variable agents must observe for valuation, E as x,t weIl as in the noise-creating disturbances, Yt and E . The last part p,t of the proposition is explained by the reduction of informativeness of the signal P t as 0 2 increases. 12 Ep Finally, relating back to the discussion in the previous section of the impact of shifts in structural parameters on price adjustment, Proposition 2 allows a complete analysis of the impact on price adjustment relative to full information adjustment of changes in, for example, the variances of the fundamental factor x and the terms y and E.
Any change in these variances influence price adjustment directly p at a constant share of informed agents by their effect on average misperceptions about the factor x~, in (17) . They also influence price 'adjustment through their erfect on the share of inrormed agents as des er ibed in Propos i t ion 2.
In general, the two effects would be offsetting since the incentive to acquire information is enhanced through (22) term e p,t is zero, then nobody v;ill acquire costly I f the noise term is not zero but uncertain, then the price will not be fully informative about informed agents' knowledge.
Thus, agenLs may choose to acquire east ly information as in the previous case.
This discussion has bearing on the literature on convergence to RE equilibrium as e.g., in Frydman (1982) , and Bray and Savin (1986) and Marcet and Sargent (1988) .
In this literature agents run in every period a regression of price on fundamental factors in previous periods estimating reduced form coefficients as in (10) or (17) . investing in capability to gather and analyze data. However, in the normal case we would expect information investments to halt before all agents acquire capability to analyze p or other structural parameters, since the larger the share of informed agents the more information about these parameters is revealed in the price.
V.
Degree of ~larket Efficiency and Sources of Noise in the Market Price
If the concept of efficiency is restricted to the financial market without regard to the information market the informativeness of the price signal to those not acquiring information would seem to be a reasonable definition of efficiency. If information acquisition is disregarded, efficiency in this sense is reduced by an increasing variance of the noise terms in the earnings and the price signal, 0 2 ep Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) show how increasing noise in a price signal increases the incentive to acquire information. The larger share of informed agents offsets the effect of higher price noise on informational efficiency.
Another way to look at efficiency is to evaluate how financial and informat ion markets work s imul taneous ly in order to optimize the information available to agents. In this sense, inefficiency would be increasing with the difference between an optimal share of informed agents and the actual share. The optimal share is the share of firms choosing to become informed when the marginal cost of information equals the social benefit of information acquisition. Social and private benefits are equal in the absence of' externalities from information acquisition.
In the framework presented above trlere is a positive externaiity due to the revelation of informed agents' information through the financial asset price. The effect on total information availability in the market of this externality could formally be measured by calculating the difference between equilibrium A when the incentive to acquire information is evaluated conditionai an R and P+ Before turning to the sources of noise, i-c can be noted that externalities of information acquisition occur for other reasons than simply through the price. For example, a speculator or a trader, who is known to have invested substantiai resources in capability to gather and analyze information will be closely watched and imitated. Similarly, a trader who has developed a profitable -crading rule will be noticed and imitated.
As noted above, a high variance of the noise term f: t in the p, previous analysis would be interpreted as an inefficiency in most financial market analysis although its existence is a requirement for information acquisition. The existence of the noise term within the framework of the above RE model can be explained by several factors, the existence of which are contrary to the strong assumptions of traditional RE modeIs, but not to efficiency in financial markets per se.
The following list contains some alternative reasons for lack of informativeness in the asset price: where A is an expression containing parameters such as time series parameters, costs of information, the risk-aversion coefficient, etc., as weIl as the share of informed firms A.
In the previous section it was assumed that uninformed agents know that informed agents can observe either x t or the structural parameters 
c)
Imperfect knowledge of what information is acquired Even if uninformed agents know structure with certainty, the nature of explicit information that is purchased or acquired in information markets may not be known to those who do not buy it. For example, in foreign exchange markets forecast advisory services sell an exchange rate forecast but this forecast is of ten accompanied by the service's reasoning about several fundamental factors like x t which may cause expected exchange rate changes. (Glick and Wihlborg, 1986) . In other words, informed agents buy a bundle of information about disturbances with instructions for its decomposition, which is unavailable to the uninformed. Admati and PfleidertV'(l985) argue 1:. hat an informative supplier actually has an incentive to "contaminate" the information in order to ove r come a free-ride problem.
d) Imperfections in the information market So far, little has been said about the functioning of the information market. It was simply assumed that agents, who have the incentive to acquire information do so and that the equilibrium share is known. There are a number of problems with this assumption. In the absence of knowledge about A, the price signal in (23) The answer to this question depends on what the cost of information actually refers to. In the setting of a market for information with many suppliers it is of course impossible for each supplier to inform each agent about how many others have purchased information. However, the incentive to purchase information in (22) requires knowledge of A.
Thus, either the market may break down due to the indeterminacy of the incentive to gather information or a monopolistic supplier may be formed. This monopolist would have to announee to each potential customer the value of A at different times. In the absence of a market, knowledge of A for each agent is possible i f there is sufficient heterogeneity in the incentive to acquire information due to differential costs of access to information, and if each agent knows the 16 structure of these costs across agents.
Some uncertainty about the share of informed agents may remain. In this case, the price signal in the market becomes more noisy and the free rider problem is alleviated. e) Imperfeet market clearing and market organization Though asset markets are perhaps eloser to perfect auction markets than other markets, they cannot be considered as such. We enter here into the rapidly expanding analysis of market micro-structure. In this literature the determinants of bid-ask spreads are analyzed but also the mechanism by which participants' information is revealed. 17
For the purposes of this paper we are concerned with the extent to which an agent can use superior information without revealing that he or she has superior information before a contract is entered. For example, if each agent is small in the market-place and this agent believes that others do not have the same information, then the expected effect on -23-\ price of transacting with the superior information is negligible. The first-comer advantage can be utilized fully. However, if many agents have the same thought then no profit will materialize.
The literature on micro-market structure deals with the specific rules under which dealers, specialists, traders, etc. interact in the market to determine a price. Information revelation depends on these rules. There is no space to enter into this whole literature here but each specific market structure allows different opportunities for an individual to enter a contract without revealing information to the other party to the transaction. For example, in the interbank foreign exchange market each bank offers other agents to buy or sell at a given price. This arrangement allows the bank's customers to take advantage of specific information and only through actual transactions will it be revealed to other market participants.
In this example there is an interval between the time at which an agent enters a contract and the time at which the price includes the information based on which the contract is entered. The longer this time interval the more noisy is P ab out the current information set of 1:
other agents.
The conclusion of this section is that market imperfections of ten exist and/or there is substantiaI uncertainty ab out the contents of price signal. It cannot be ruled out, however, that externalities of information acquisition exist through price revelation as weIl as through imitation in the marketplace. Empirical evidence is discussed in the concluding section.
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\ VI. Alternative Modes for Information Acquisition and Transmission Under Asymmetric Information
There are many channels through which information is disseminated only some of which involve outright acquisition. Advertising and public relations may be informative about the demand and cost conditions faced by a firm (see e.g. Kotowitz and Mathewson, 1979) . Voluntary or required disclosure related to takeovers has an informational role (Grossman and Hart, 1980) . Management may simply precommit to disclose information on a continuous basis absorbing the cost of information dispersal (Diamond, 1985) . Such information release serves as a substitute for information gathering activities by outside market participants . Signalling of information, monitoring by specialized agents, insider trading, and outsiders with a stake taking control, may also serve as substitutes for information acquisition.
In this section, as few aspects of alternative modes for transmitting firm-specific information from well-informed managers to market participants are discussed. Of particular interest here is the potential interdependence between the internaI efficiency of a firm and the information available to market participants.
Consider a situation in which the current performance CRt) based on levels of ability, effort and technology is known but for valuation it is necessary to obtain information about p in the model. A literature has developed on the possibilities of signalling information to market participants. For example, the debt-equity structure of the firm may be used as a signal about the earnings prospects of the firm (Ross, 1977) . Leland and Pyle (1977) propose that an increase in stock-holdings of managers signal a belief in the future earnings relative to the market's valuation. Masulis (1987) contain an overview of the expanding literature on signalling through financial structure. The thrust of this literature is that by incurring a cost of some kind, managers information about the prospects of the firm can be revealed. Only very general information can be revealed this way. More specific information allowing market participants to form their own judgment about the firm f s prospects cannot be revealed this way.
In the principal-agent literature current and :uture values of the firm-specific factor are not completely exogenous. The effort level as weIl as investment and product developme~t decisions of managers are of ten based on objectives that differ from those of stock-holders.
Therefore, the specification of the contract between the principals (stock-holders) and their agents (managers) are important for creating manageriai incentives that are compatible with stock-holders objectives. Holmstrom (1977) discusses such contract design under moral hazard and the role of monitoring. Manageriai remuneration can be based on relatively easily monitored proxies for the quaiity of management' s decision. In this case, information acquisition by stock-holders become an endogenous part of the relationship between financial market participants and the firm. In other modeis, optimal contracts include equity participation by managers in which case the information contents of the price of equity becomes a concern of managers and influence their behavior. In terms of the model in Section III an incentive contract may, as noted, influence the growth of earnings, p, and uncertainty about this parameter. Thus, the contract provides partiaI information to the market ab out some insiders view of the firm's prospects. Such a contract must be monitored, however, a process which is costly. In the model framework, earnings in every period is a relatively easily monitored variable but it prov ides only period-specific information and this information is noisy. Incentive contracts linked to this period-specific variable may cause welfare losses of the type discussed in Marino and Campbell (1989) in this volume, if the objective of the contract is to influence managers' performance with respect to earnings growth, p. This parameter would be reflected in the stock market price in an informationally efficient market but not in current earnings.
Contracts linked to the stock market price are obviously easily monitor ed but the analysis above implies that information about p is revealed in the price only if information costs are incurred by some agents. Thus, the internaI efficiency properties of incentive contracts and the information reflected in stock market prices are determined simultaneously.
In general, one would expect contractual and institutionaI configurations that minimize the sum of internaI welfare losses and costs of information acquisition and monitoring by stockholders. As suggested by the analysis of Chan, Siegel and Thakor (1987) , the optimal contraeturaI arrangement could be that stock-holders take controI of a venture and become insiders in order to reduce information costs related to monitoring of performance.
A controversial issue in financial markets is the role of inside information. It may be the only type of information that is available to potential market-participants at a zero cost. Accordingly, only if insider trading is allowed is it possible to obtain market efficiency in the traditional sense. A decentralized financial market. need not be the most efficient organization for dissemination of information in this case.
Most of the formal analysis in the paper has been devoted to the more limited notion of efficiency in a decentralized securities market.
It was argued that if important information about fundamental variables and/or structural parameters can be acquired only at a cost, then common finance concepts of market efficiency are misleading since they take the information set of agents as exogenous. An alternative definition of efficiency recognizing the simultaneous determination of financial market and information mark et equilibrium was suggested.
Financial and information markets can be considered increasingly inefficient the fewer are the agents who become informed relative to those who become informed in the absence of externalities in information acquisition. These externalities occur by revelation of information through the equilibrium price and/or through imitation and observation of well-informed agents in the market.
-29l It was shown that the inefficiency in the markets is decreasing as the noise in the price signal to the uninformed is increasing. This result is seemingly contrary to conventionaI analysis of efficiency with exogenous information sets. The conventionaI concept of efficiency presumes that noise in the price signal is caused by some remediable market failure such as the existence of monopolistic institutions protecting inefficient traders and inefficient organizational structures. However, in competitve markets, the noisiness of price with respect to specific types of information is caused by simultaneous uncertainty about disturbances, structural parameters and others' information sets, as weIl as by the lack of a perfect auctioneer. In this analysis these factors contribute to market efficiency by alleviating a free rider problem in information acquisition.
A welfare oriented analysis of asset pricing is complex. The definition of market efficiency suggested here is welfare oriented but it does not consider a potential governmental role in information dissemination. A topical welfare oriented policy issue is the role of insider trading. It was noted that since insiders are the only agents who are costlessly informed, insider trading may improve informational efficiency. However, permission of such trading could increase transactions costs in the market (King and Roell, 1988) and managers decisions may be influenced by the ability to profit in the market in the short term.
Finally, considering the empirical evidence on market efficiency in the traditional sense there is an increasing body of evidence in foreign exchange and stock markets indicating inefficiency in the traditional sense.
In foreign ex ch ange markets, Hansen and Hodrick (1980) rejected semi-strong form efficiency for several markets while Gweke and Feige (1978) rejected it only for one out of seven markets. Hodrick and Srivastava (1984) , Levy and Nobay (1986) , Baille et al (1983) also reject efficiency in tests of restrictions imposed by strict rationaI expectations. Schiller's (1981) work on stock-market price variability and his controversial statement that prices are characterized by "excess" variability due to mass-psychological phenomena has stimulated a substantiaI amount of research on "bubbles" and other sources of excess variability .
Most bubble tests have been performed on inflation and foreign exchange market data (see, for example, Flood and Garber, 1980; Frankel and Froot; , Meese, 1987 . The ana1ysis pertaining to bubbles in stock markets is limited to variance bound tests as, for example, in Grossman and Schiller (1981) , LeRoy (1984) , Mankiw, Romer and Shapiro (1985) , and Kleidon (1987 Grossman, 1976, and Bray, 1982 for a further discussion of this concept.
5.
Reasans for failures of information markets are discussed in, for example, Admati and Pfleiderer (1986), Demsetz, (1969) and Glick and Wihlborg (1985) .
6. See Glick and Wihlborg, 1985, fn. 11 and footnote below.
7. The terms within { } in (13) can be written as:
-e 8. If each individual acquries information expecting no one else to do the same as in, for example, Diamond (1985) , then the incentive to acquire information is independent of the externaiity. 9. Glick and Wihlborg (1985) and (1989) contain explicit analyses of this problem in the context of goods market adjustments. They show that the effect of information acquisition is of ten to offset fully or partially the direct effect on adjustment of a shift in a structural parameter.
10. In recent years an empirical literature has developed on testing for "bubbles" and/or "sunspots" (see e. g., ~1eese, 1987 and Flood and Garber, 1982) . These concepts have the connotation of some irrationaiity and "excessive" price volatility . Bubbles refer to price changes due to self-fulfilling expectations about future price changes unrelated to fund~mentals while sunspots are normally associated with extraneous variables i.e., non-fundamentals which by agents are believed to be fundamentals.
This proposition does not hold if information acquisiton requires
investment in capability to gather and analy.ze information. In this case, the incentive to invest is obtained by forming expectations in period t of the gains from being informed in future periods. The sum over time of the incentive described in equation (22) on the left hand side would be compared to the investment.
The time specific term in (22) would be a variance, since future realizations of variables would be unknown at the time expectations are formed.
12. Analogous results are obtained in Glick and Wihlborg (1985) and (1986) .
13. In Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) an increase in noise has no effect on the informativeness of the price system due to the exactly offsetting effeets of inereased noise and inereased information aequisition.
14. Stein (1987) argues that the informativeness of asset prices could fall as a result of speculative aetivity when risk-neutral speeulators are less informed than other risk-averse market participants . When information is costly this situation seems implausible, since risk-neutral agents aequire information based on any expeeted improvement in the valuation of the asset while a risk-averse agent would acquire information only if the improvement is expeeted to exeeed a risk-premium.
15. Individuals I assumptions and knowledge about others I expeetation formation playan important role in rationaI expeetations modeIs.
In macroeconmies, it is of ten assumed that all agents use simple, identical forecast rules, based on knowledge of struetural parameters. Frydman (1982) points out that the assumption ab out expeetat:ion rormation is somewhat arbitrary and it may not represent optimizing behavior by agents. He argues that, if agents, in order to rorecast future prices, estimate the parameters of a model by running regressions of price on exogenous variables, then convergence to a RE equilibrium may not oecur unIess eaeh individual' s priee forecast is a "consensus " foreeast of price on exogenous variables alone. However, eaeh agent has an ineentive to try to diseover how others form expeetation and try to profit from this information. The term E {(l+r) -(l+r ) } making these substitutions in (Al), equation (22) in the text is derived.
Appendix II.
The incentive to acquire informatioc is decreasing in the share of informed agents.
Equ~libriurr:
. .
. , . .
. ~ ln tne lnrormatlon marKet requires that the left nand side in (22) is decreasing relative to the right hand side as \ /I. increases.
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First we studv 0-as a function of l. ~ithout formal oroof -x • we observe in (17) that as A increases a larger proportion of the variance in price P is due to the variance in E relative to variances t x in y and E p Thus the informativeness of P with respect t increasing in A and 02U is decreasing in A. Consider next Q
x to E is x 2U. 21
r ' r
This term is also decreasing in A since, as A increases, the perception error of the uninformed about E decreases and therefore, the rorecast x,t of P t+l by the uninformed approaches the forecast of the informed.
